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Abstract
Using a tax compliance game, we study whether the observability of the taxpayer’s
financial accounting information and the statutory auditor’s report affects the tax com-
pliance. We find that firms’ responses differ significantly between private and public
firms. Private firms compensate for the reported signals by understating both book and
tax valuations. We find that introducing the informative signals does not necessarily
increase efficiency. In fact, for private firms, it may also lead to lower tax revenues.
For public firms, however, the positive effect of using the informative signals on tax
compliance is much more pronounced. The usage of audit reports in addition to finan-
cial accounting statements always increases tax revenues from public firms. Regarding
changes in book-tax conformity, we find that higher book-tax conformity can lead to
higher tax revenues from public firms; however, tax revenues from private firms de-
crease with higher book-tax conformity.
Keywords: Tax compliance game; Tax audit; Book-tax conformity; Strategic auditing.
JEL Classifications: H26, M41, M42.
1 Introduction
Using a game-theoretical model, this paper investigates whether tax auditors should
use additional information from financial accounting statements and statutory auditor
reports to select their audit cases. In many countries, tax administration budgets de-
clined significantly in recent years, and tax administrations, therefore, reduced their
workforce. For example, the United States Internal Revenue Service reduced the num-
ber of its employees from 94,600 in 2010 to 78,100 in 2015 (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities 2016). Similarly, the number of employees at the U.K. tax authority,
the HMRC, fell from 91,167 in 2005 to 61,370 in 2014 (Slemrod 2016). This raises
the importance of improving the audit selection process to increase audit efficiency.
The idea is straightforward: First, in general, values from financial accounting are
positively correlated with values in tax accounting, meaning that financial accounting
information could provide an informative signal for tax auditors (Mills and Sansing
2000). Second, financial accounting statements are often subject to a statutory au-
dit that is conducted by an independent private auditor, usually a certified public ac-
countant. The statutory audit includes the audit of deferred taxes that arise whenever
there are temporary accounting differences between financial and tax accounting. If
the statutory auditor confirms or doubts the deferred tax position in her audit report,
this report provides an informative signal to the tax auditor with respect to the correct
tax treatment. By using the information from financial accounting statements and the
statutory auditor’s report, tax auditors could thus improve their audit efficiency, which
should in turn result in higher tax compliance. In line with this idea, firms in many
countries are obliged to file their financial accounting statements together with their
tax returns, e.g., in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and in some coun-
tries, firms must also file their audit report to the tax administration, e.g., in Belgium,
Germany, and the United Kingdom (see Table 3, Appendix 6.1).
However, despite its potential to increase tax compliance, the usage of information
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from financial accounting statements and audit reports might also trigger opposing
effects. Some firms may attempt to decrease detection risk and manipulate or avoid
the signal, for example, by understating not only taxable income but also financial
accounting income such that no deferred taxes arise. Other firms may have a further
increased incentive to misreport taxable income. They could align financial and tax in-
come by downward managing their taxable income and might thus benefít from lower
audit probabilities for conforming reports. In contrast to intuition, the overall effect
of using financial accounting information and audit reports in the tax audit selection
process is therefore unclear. The aim of the current paper is to formally derive the con-
ditions under which the usage of such additional information increases or decreases
the efficiency in a strategic tax compliance game.
Most previous tax compliance research explains tax evasion as taxpayers maximiz-
ing their expected utility given the detection probability and the size of the penalty
(Allingham and Sandmo 1972). However, this fails to recognize that the detection
probability is in fact endogenous and the result of a game between taxpayers and the
government. Graetz et al. (1986) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) were the first to
study tax compliance as a game in which the revenue agency could not credibly com-
mit to an audit strategy. Reinganum and Wilde (1988) introduce taxpayer uncertainty
regarding the government’s audit costs, and Beck and Jung (1989) consider tax liabil-
ity uncertainty. In Beck et al. (1996), taxpayers are allowed to purchase tax advice to
resolve all uncertainty. Erard and Feinstein (1994) modify the approach of Reinganum
and Wilde (1986) to consider nonstrategic taxpayers. Rhoades (1999) analyzes the
impact of component reporting on the tax compliance game. Bayer (2006) considers
taxpayers’ concealment costs and demonstrates that higher tax rates lead to higher tax
evasion and higher concealment and audit costs. Other studies analyze the effect of a
signal regarding the taxpayer’s income on the audit process. Sansing (1993) examines
a signal regarding the correct tax treatment of a loss. He demonstrates that this sig-
nal can result in an increased amount of tax evasion while tax revenues (before audit
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costs) remain unaffected. Beck et al. (2000) study the effect of voluntary disclosures
regarding an uncertain tax benefit to avoid a substantial underpayment penalty if the
tax return is audited. Related to the study of Beck et al. (2000), De Simone et al.
(2013) investigate the benefits of "Enhanced Relationship Tax Compliance Programs".
The two studies most related to our paper are Mills and Sansing (2000) and Mills
et al. (2010). In Mills and Sansing (2000), the tax auditor observes the (correct) fi-
nancial statement valuation, which results in a higher audit probability for positive
book-tax-differences. Mills et al. (2010) investigate the effects of disclosed uncertain
tax positions according to FIN 48. Contradicting public opinion, they demonstrate
that some taxpayers will actually benefit from the mandatory disclosure requirements.
We contribute to this research by studying the effect of a (imperfect) statutory audit
of deferred taxes. By contrast, previous studies assume that independent auditors en-
sure consistently correct financial reporting. Moreover, previous research treats the
financial accounting report as exogenous. We expand these models by allowing tax-
payers to misreport both financial and tax reporting positions. Importantly, firms differ
in their willingness to understate their financial accounting income to save on taxes.
We follow an extensive literature demonstrating that private firms place less emphasis
on financial reporting outcomes than do publicly listed firms (Mills 1998, Mills and
Newberry 2001, Beuselinck et al. 2015, Lynch et al. 2017). Thus, in our analysis,
we differentiate between public and private firms, where only the latter are willing to
understate financial accounting income to save on taxes.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. In a benchmark case, we assume that no observ-
able information beyond the reported tax return is available. A firm’s taxable income
can be either low or high; similarly, a firm’s financial accounting income can be either
low or high. Firms decide whether to report their taxable income truthfully or whether
to evade taxes. Tax auditors decide, based on the reported tax returns, whether to con-
duct a tax audit. In a second step, we add observable financial accounting information,
and financial accounting values are positively correlated with tax values. Firms can
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now decide not only on reports for tax purposes but also for financial accounting pur-
poses. In a third step, we integrate an observable statutory auditor report that includes
a noisy signal on the correctness of deferred taxes.
Our findings reveal that the firm’s responses to the tax auditor’s usage of information
from financial accounting and audit reports differ significantly between private and
public firms. The average tax evasion of private firms is not affected by the observ-
ability of financial accounting information because private firms compensate for the
informative financial statement signal by understating both financial accounting and
tax valuations. Only if the audit report is also observable does tax evasion by private
firms decrease. In contrast, tax evasion by public firms is much more responsive to the
informative signals because public firms cannot avoid the signaling by underreporting
financial accounting income due to their strict preference for high financial accounting
values.
Furthermore the tax revenue implications differ between public and private firms. Sur-
prisingly, for private firms, the observability of an audit report may lead to lower tax
revenues. This result depends on the incentives of the tax auditor and the book-tax
conformity. Only if we assume high-powered tax auditor incentives does the signal
increase tax revenues from private firms and reduce audit costs. With low-powered tax
auditor incentives, private firms have an incentive to present conforming tax and finan-
cial statements to avoid the signal. This can result in lower tax revenues, in particular,
if book-tax-conformity is high. In contrast, for public firms, the observability of the
audit report always increases tax revenues compared to the situation with only observ-
able financial accounting statements. However, if we compare tax revenues with those
in the setting without information, we observe that tax revenues could also decrease
due to the informative signals. This holds for both public and private firms.
Overall, tax revenue and audit cost implications are highly complex and largely depend
on tax auditor incentives, book-tax conformity, the firms’ preference for tax savings,
the firms’ financial reporting costs, and the tax competence of the statutory auditor.
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One main finding is that higher book-tax conformity decreases tax revenues from pri-
vate firms, whereas it increases tax revenues from public firms if tax auditors are not
highly incentivized. Previous empirical studies on the effect of book-tax-conformity
on tax avoidance use only data from publicly listed firms. These studies find a posi-
tive effect of book-tax conformity on tax compliance (Chan et al. 2010, Atwood et al.
2012, Tang 2015). This is in line with our results for public firms if tax auditors are not
highly incentivized. However, in light of our results, one should be cautious in gen-
eralizing our empirical findings to private firms because we would expect exactly the
opposite effect of book-tax conformity for private firms. Moreover, for private firms,
higher book-tax conformity leads to less-informative financial statements, as firms un-
derstate their assets in their financial statements to reduce expected tax payments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the second section, we present
the model. In the third section, we conduct the equilibrium analysis. We begin by
analyzing the equilibrium effect of observable financial statement valuation (section
3.1) and then integrate the observable audit report (section 3.2). Section 4 investigates
the efficiency implications of the equilibrium, and the last section concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a sequential game to analyze the interactions between tax and financial
statement valuation, the audit of financial statements, and tax audits. In the first stage
the manager of a firm (in the following denoted as taxpayer) faces an asset valuation
issue. The asset’s correct book value in the financial statements is b ∈ {b,b}. The
same valuation issue arises for tax purposes, where the proper valuation is t ∈ {t, t}.
We define ∆b = b−b and ∆t = t−t and assume b= t and b= t. Thus, ∆b =∆t =∆. The
correct valuations are the taxpayer’s private information1 and we assume the following
1We do not adress taxpayer’s uncertainty about the correct valuations in this paper. An analysis of
tax uncertainty can be found in Graetz et al. (1986), Beck and Jung (1989), Beck et al. (1996), Mills et
al. (2010), or Simone et al. (2013), for example.
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common prior probability distribution over the taxpayer’s type:
Assumption 1 1. The ex ante probabilities Prob{t} and Prob{t} are 0.5.
2. The conditional probabilities Prob{b|t} are given by Prob{b|t}=Prob{b|t}= p
and Prob{b|t}= Prob{b|t}= 1− p. We assume 0.5 < p < 1.
The joint probabilities are Prob{b, t} = 0.5(1− p), Prob{b, t} = 0.5p, Prob{b, t} =
0.5p und Prob{b, t}= 0.5(1− p). Furthermore, Prob{b}= Prob{b}= 0.5.
Assumption 1 ensures that in the joint probability distribution for tax and financial
statement valuation t and b are interchangeable. Furthermore, the parameter p can be
interpreted as a measure of the conformity between tax and financial statement valua-
tion. A strong conformity will be given if p→ 1, and a low conformity is represented
by p→ 0.5. In this sense, the assumption p > 0.5 ensures that the correlation between
tax law and financial statement valuation is positive.
After observing the proper values, the taxpayer decides about the valuations bˆ and tˆ to
be reported. The taxpayer may bias the valuation because he is interested in low earn-
ings for tax assessment and in high earnings in the financial statements. We assume
that the taxpayer maximizes the objective function
max
bˆ,tˆ
E(ω ·b′− γ · t ′−S(t ′)−H(b′)), (1)
where b′ = b′(bˆ, tˆ) and t ′ = t ′(bˆ, tˆ) are the valuations after tax and financial statement
audits given the reports bˆ and tˆ. S and H denote disutility from monetary penalties and
reputational losses due when an incorrect valuation is detected either in the tax or in
the financial statements, respectively. They are defined by
S(t ′) =
S, if t
′ 6= tˆ
0, else
and H(b′) =
H, if b
′ 6= bˆ
0, else.
(2)
6
The parameters ω and γ are positive weights indicating the taxpayer’s preferences for
financial statement and tax valuation. In the following, we consider two different types
of taxpayer firms:
1. γ >ω indicates that the taxpayer’s preferences are more sensitive to the tax than
to the financial statement valuation. This is typical for firms characterized by
almost no capital market exposure, by managers not driven by financial reporting
measures and by less important outside debt financing. We denote taxpayers
with γ > ω as private firms for the remainder of the paper.
2. γ < ω characterizes firms where tax reporting decisions are less important than
financial reporting. For example, in big firms reporting is delegated to managers
whose incentives are strongly affected by financial reporting measures if their
remuneration is linked to them. Additionally, financial reporting may be impor-
tant because capital market financing requires regular financial reports. In the
following, we call firms with ω ≥ γ publicly listed firms. Note that the above
distinction between private and public firms follows an extensive research that
shows private firms place less emphasis on financial reporting outcomes than
publicly listed firms (Mills 1998, Mills and Newberry 2001, Beuselinck et al.
2015, Lynch et al. 2017).
In the next stage the statutory auditor conducts the annual financial statement audit.
The auditor is not modeled as a strategic player and acts as follows:
1. The financial statements show deferred tax assets or liabilities whenever bˆ 6= tˆ.
This position critically depends on the tax valuation tˆ, and, thus, the auditor
reports on the validity of tˆ. This report is denoted as signal σ . The auditor may
confirm (σ = C) or doubt (σ = D) the reported tax valuation. The statistical
relation between the auditor’s report on the tax valuation after observing tˆ = t
and the true valuation is given by
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Prob{σ |t, tˆ = t}=
σ =C σ = D
t = t µ 1−µ
t = t 1−λ λ
Intuitively, the parameters µ,λ ∈ [0.5,1] denote the auditor’s tax competence.
µ = λ = 1 represents a fully competent auditor, and µ = λ = 0.5 an auditor
with no competences in tax valuation.
It is not necessary to specify such a relation for bˆ = b and tˆ = t, because the
model assumptions (explained below) are such that the tax auditor never audits
a high tax valuation. Therefore, the auditor’s report σ will never have any value
to the tax auditor.
2. The statutory auditor always confirms a correct high valuation bˆ= b and accepts
an overreported false report with probability ξh. An incorrect low valuation
b will be accepted with a probability ξl with 0 ≤ ξh < ξl .2 For the sake of
simplicity, we assume ξh = 0 and ξl = 1. We assume a sufficiently large penalty
H, such that bˆ = b in case of a true valuation b is never optimal for the taxpayer.
The second strategic player is the risk neutral tax auditor, who observes the valuations
bˆ, tˆ and (if any) the auditor’s report σ =C or σ = D. The auditor may then decide to
audit the tax valuation (a = 1) or not (a = 0). For the sake of simplicity, we assume
a perfect tax audit technology. The tax auditor benefits from detecting an understated
tax valuation (represented by the preference parameter δ ) and incurs personal audit
costs KS, if an audit is conducted. Thus, his objective function is
max
a∈{0,1}
E(δ max{t ′(a)− tˆ, 0}−K(a)), (3)
2Francis and Krishnan (1999) provide some evidence that auditors are more likely to issue modified
audit reports for high income-increasing accruals than for high income decreasing accruals.
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where
t ′(a) =
tˆ, if a = 0t, else and K(a) =
KS, if a = 10, else (4)
In order to generate tax audit incentives we have to assume δ∆−KS > 0. Obviously, the
tax auditor will never review a tax valuation tˆ = t. The following figure 1 summarizes
the timing of our model.3
b, t bˆ = b, tˆ = t
b, t bˆ = b, tˆ = t
b, t bˆ = b, tˆ = t
b, t bˆ = b, tˆ = t
report D
report C
no report
no report
report D
report C
tax audit
no tax audit
tax audit
no tax audit
no tax audit
tax audit
no tax audit
no tax audit
no tax audit
Taxpayer’s type Taxpayer reports Report on def. tax Tax auditor audits
Figure 1: Timing and strategies in the model: First, nature assigns a type b, t to the firm.
Knowing his type, the taxpayer releases a report (bˆ, tˆ). If tax and financial statement valuations
differ, the statutory auditor generates a signal σ ∈ {C,D}. At the last stage, the tax auditor
decides on auditing the tax valuation (conditional σ , if available, and on (bˆ, tˆ)).
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we look at the taxpayer’s and the tax auditor’s equilibrium strategies.
The key question analyzed here is how an auditor’s opinion on deferred taxes influ-
3The figure is not an extensive form game tree. Information sets are not considered and we also
supressed actions never played in equilibrium (as discussed above).
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ences taxpayer’s reporting and the tax auditor’s inspection behavior. Thus, we develop
our equilibrium analysis in three stages. In the first step, financial statement valuation
is unobservable by the tax auditor. In the second step, we show how the observable
financial statement valuation is used in an equilibrium. In our third step, we derive the
equilibrium with the auditor’s report on deferred taxes available to the tax auditor.
3.1 Unobservable and observable financial statement valuation
As a first step, we compute the equilibrium without observable financial statement
valuation and auditor’s verification of deferred taxes. In this case, the game boils
down to a simple variant of the inspection game. Thus, proposition 1 replicates the
equilibrium strategies well known in the literature.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the tax auditor can observe neither the financial statement
valuation nor the auditor’s opinion with respect to deferred taxes. In this case, the
equilibrium strategies are as follows:
• Taxpayer: Type t reports truthfully. Type t reports t with probability θ = KSδ∆−KS
as long as KSδ∆−KS ≤ 1. Type t always reports t for
KS
δ∆−KS > 1.
• Tax auditor: Report t is never verified. Report t is verified with probability
β o = γ∆γ∆+S for
KS
δ∆−KS ≤ 1 and never for
KS
δ∆−KS > 1.
Proof: See appendix. 
The term θ = KSδ∆−KS can be interpreted as a reverse measure of the tax auditor’s in-
centives. Low values of θ represent low audit costs and high rewards for detecting
underreporting, implying high powered incentives. A combination of high audit costs
and low rewards yields low powered incentives to the tax auditor and a large θ .
Proposition 1 states that the taxpayers’s misreporting probability decreases with the
tax auditor’s net incentives. The unique mixed strategy equilibrium vanishes if net
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incentives become very low. In this case, the taxpayer always misreports and the tax
auditor never challenges the reported tax valuation.
The equilibrium will generally not remain valid if the tax auditor can observe the tax-
payer’s financial statement valuation. Since b can be informative about the true tax
valuation t, the tax auditor will make use of this information. Proposition 2 states the
concrete strategies:
Proposition 2 Suppose the tax auditor can observe the book value b. Then the equi-
librium consists of the following strategies:
• Types b, t and b, t always report their true valuations.
• The tax auditor never audits a tax valuation t.
In case of a private firm (ω < γ), the following probabilities are assigned to types’
b, t and b, t reporting strategies and the tax auditor’s audit strategies upon receiving
reports (b, t) and (b, t):
θ ≤ 1−pp 1−pp < θ ≤ 1 1 < θ ≤ p1−p
Type b, t reports (b, t) φ = 1−pp θ φ φ
Type b, t reports (b, t) 0 ν = θ − 1−pp ν = 1−φ
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−φ 1−φ −ν 0
Type b, t reports (b, t) η = p1−pθ 1 1
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−η 0 0
Audit report (b, t) α f = γ∆γ∆+S α
f = γ∆γ∆+S α
f = ω∆γ∆+S
Audit report (b, t) β f = γ∆γ∆+S β
f = ∆(γ−ω)γ∆+S β
f = 0
In case of a publicly owned firm (ω ≥ γ), the reporting and audit strategies are
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θ ≤ 1−pp 1−pp < θ ≤ p1−p
Type b, t reports (b, t) φ = 1−pp θ φ
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−φ 1−φ
Type b, t reports (b, t) η = p1−pθ 1
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−η 0
Audit report (b, t) α f = γ∆γ∆+S α
f = γ∆γ∆+S
Audit report (b, t) β f = γ∆γ∆+S β
f = 0
If θ > p1−p , both types b, t and b, t always report t and the tax auditor never audits.
Proof: See appendix. 
Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium strategies depend not only on the auditor’s
incentives (represented by θ ) but also on the conformity between commercial and tax
law (represented by p). The term 1−pp approaches zero in case of strong conformity
(p→ 1) and it approaches 1, if financial statement and tax valuation are independent
(p→ 0.5). Moreover, compared to proposition 1 the range of nontrivial equilibria
extends from θ ≤ 1 to θ ≤ p1−p . This is due to the more sophisticated audit strategy
facilitated by additional information.
The mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized by two generic properties: (1) Tax-
payers will only report those combinations of b and t with a positive probability that
lead to identical expected payoffs given the equilibrium tax audit probabilities. (2)
The probabilities of reporting these alternatives make the tax auditor indifferent be-
tween auditing and not auditing the reports (b, t) and (b, t). This payoff equality in
equilibrium is responsible for the main difference between the reporting strategies of
taxpayers with both a high financial statement and tax valuation in private and publicly
listed firms as will be explicated below.
The reporting strategies of type t taxpayers are depicted in figure 2. Under high pow-
ered auditor incentives (θ < (1−p)p ) the reporting behaviour does not depend on the
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θ0
1
0 1−p
p
1 p
1−p
(a) Private firm (γ > ω)
θ0
1
0 1−p
p
1 p
1−p
(b) Publicly owned firm (ω ≥ γ)
Figure 2: Type b, t reporting strategies as a function of θ . θ measures the tax auditor’s incentives
(as defined in Proposition 1). With increasing θ the tax auditor’s incentives decrease. The dotted
line depicts Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)}, the dashed line Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)} and the solid line
Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)}.
relation between γ and ω . Type b, t is indifferent between the truth and imitating type
b, t. This region gets especially small for high tax conformity ( (1−p)p → 0) because of
the lower ex ante probability of type b, t.
Decreasing the tax auditor’s incentives changes the reporting strategies in different
ways. Together with a lower tax audit probability of report (b, t), type b, t always un-
derreports the tax valuation. Type b, t taxpayers in private firms additionally understate
book and tax valuation with positive probability. The latter is a reaction to the tax au-
ditor’s ability to exploit correlations between financial statement and tax valuation. In
a public firm, however, understating the financial statement valuation is not attractive
for type b, t, because ω > γ implies ωb− γt > ωb− γt. Thus, reporting b together
with t cannot be part of an equilibrium.
In case of 1 < θ < p1−p , the tax auditor’s incentives are such that the report (b, t) will
never be verified. Then, a private firm taxpayer with type b, t never reveals his true type
but is indifferent between reporting t together with either b or b. Taxpayers of type b, t
in publicly listed firms, however, are still indifferent between truthful reporting and
report (b, t).
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Figure 3 shows the tax auditor’s corresponding audit probabilities. We observe a pat-
tern typical for mixed strategy equilibria: The tax auditor’s incentives influence the
taxpayer’s strategies but not the audit probabilities β f and α f . They only change with
a switch in the equilibrium regions.
θ0
1
0 1−p
p
1 p
1−p
(a) Private firm (γ > ω)
θ0
1
0 1−p
p
1 p
1−p
(b) Publicly owned firm (ω ≥ γ)
Figure 3: The tax auditor’s audit strategy as a function of θ . θ measures the tax auditor’s
incentives (as defined in Proposition 1). With increasing θ the tax auditor’s incentives decrease.
The dotted line depicts the audit probability for report (b, t) (denoted with α f ), the solid line
represents the audit probability for report (b, t) (β f ).
Some interesting properties of the equilibrium in proposition 2 should be noted:
1. Mills and Sansing (2000) derive a mixed strategy equilibrium in a similar set-
ting. Two differences between our and their model imply different results: (1) In
Mills and Sansing (2000), the taxpayer has no chance to understate the financial
statement valuation. Instead, he always reports the financial statement valuation
truthfully. (2) Variations in the correlation between financial statement and tax
valuation are not discussed, because the correlation is restricted by assumption.
2. The equilibrium will be equivalent to the scenario without observable financial
statement valuation (see proposition 1) if p→ 0.5. In this case, financial state-
ment information has no information content for the tax auditor, because tax-
and financial statement valuation are not correlated.
3. The informativeness of the book value b with respect to the tax valuation t
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(driven by p) determines the taxpayer’s reporting strategy. On the one hand,
an increase of p implies a low ex - ante probability of type b, t. Thus, the tax
auditor will only be indifferent between auditing and not auditing report (b, t), if
type b, t misreports his tax valuation with a moderate probability. This explains
φ ′(p) < 0. On the other hand, a higher p allows more frequent misreporting of
b, t, because the a priori probability for type b, t increases. Thus, η ′(p)> 0 and
ν ′(p)> 0. Note that also the range of nontrivial equilibria θ < p1−p extends with
increasing p.
4. The ex-ante probability of misreporting as a measure of tax evasion is defined as
TE = 0.5p
(
Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)|b, t}+Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)|b, t})
+0.5(1− p)Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)|b, t}.
In case of unobservable financial statements, we obtain
TEo =
0.5θ , if θ ≤ 10.5, if θ > 1. (5)
Observable financial statements imply
(a) TE f = TEo in case of a private firm and
(b) TE f =

0.5θ if θ ≤ 1−pp
0.5(1− p)(1+θ) if 1−pp < θ ≤ p1−p
0.5, if θ > p1−p
in case of a publicly listed firm.
The additional information provided by the financial statements only reduces
TE, if the taxpayer has a sufficiently strong interest in the financial statement
valuation. In case of a private firm with less relevant financial statements, tax-
payers compensate the informative financial statement signal by underreporting
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both valuations. As a result, TE remains unchanged.
5. The tax audit probability of a report with positive book-tax differences (α f ) is
greater or equal to the tax audit probability of a report without book-tax differ-
ences (β f ). This is in line with previous evidence demonstrating a positive cor-
relation between tax audit adjustments and positive book-tax differences (Mills
1996, Mills and Sansing 2000).
3.2 Financial statement valuation and statutory auditor’s report
on deferred taxes observable
In the third step, we assume that both financial statement valuation and the statutory
auditor’s report on deferred taxes are observable to the tax auditor. The following
proposition states the equilibrium strategies in this case.
Proposition 3 Let λ ≥ γ∆γ∆+S and define θ¯1 = 1−pp , θ¯2 = λ pλ p+(1−µ)(1−p) and θ¯3 =
λ p
(1−µ)(1−p) . Then the taxpayer’s equilibrium strategies are as follows:
Types b, t and b, t always report their true valuations. The tax auditor never audits a
tax valuation t.
In case of a private firm (ω < γ), the following probabilities are assigned to types’
b, t and b, t reporting strategies and the tax auditor’s audit strategies upon receiving
reports (b, t), (b, t) and the statutory auditor’s deferred tax report:
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θ ≤ θ¯1 θ¯1 < θ ≤ θ¯2 θ¯2 < θ ≤ θ¯3
Type b, t reports (b, t) φa = (1−µ)(1−p)λ p θ φ
a φa
Type b, t reports (b, t) 0 νa = θ − 1−pp νa = 1−φa
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−φa 1−φa−νa 0
Type b, t reports (b, t) ηa = p1−pθ 1 1
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−ηa 0 0
Report (b, t), Signal D αa = γ∆λ (γ∆+S) α
a = γ∆λ (γ∆+S) α
a = ω∆λ (γ∆+S)
Report (b, t), Signal C 0 0 0
Report (b, t) β a = γ∆γ∆+S β
a = ∆(γ−ω)γ∆+S β
a = 0
In case of a publicly owned firm (ω ≥ γ), the reporting and audit strategies are
θ ≤ θ¯1 θ¯1 < θ ≤ θ¯3
Type b, t reports (b, t) φa = (1−µ)(1−p)λ p θ φ
a
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−φa 1−φa
Type b, t reports (b, t) ηa = p1−pθ 1
Type b, t reports (b, t) 1−ηa 0
Report (b, t), Signal D αa = γ∆λ (γ∆+S) α
a = γ∆λ (γ∆+S)
Report (b, t), Signal C 0 0
Report (b, t) β a = γ∆γ∆+S β
a = 0
If θ > λ p(1−µ)(1−p) , both types b, t and b, t always report t and the tax auditor never
audits.
Proof: See appendix. 
As a difference to proposition 2, the taxpayer’s and the tax auditor’s strategies are
not only driven by the tax auditor’s incentives and the conformity of tax and financial
statement valuation, but also by the statutory auditor’s tax competence represented by
the likelihood ratio λ1−µ .
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It is obvious that the reporting behaviour of type b, t is not affected by the statutory
auditor’s assessment on deferred taxes. This is intuitively appealing, because the de-
ferred tax opinion in case of truth telling is irrelevant and a report (b, t) will not induce
an auditor’s deferred tax evaluation. The main differences arise for taxpayers with b, t
and we will discuss them for private firms first. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the
statutory auditor’s report on type b, t reporting strategies for a private firm.
θ0
1
0 1−p
p
1 θ¯2
p
1−p θ¯3
Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)}
Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)}
Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)}
Figure 4: Private firm. Reporting probabilities of type b, t taxpayers with (dotted lines) and
without (solid lines) statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes as a function of θ . θ measures the
tax auditor’s incentives (as defined in Proposition 1). With increasing θ the tax auditor’s
incentives decrease. Introducing the statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes increases the
probability of a true taxpayer report and the probability of underreporting both tax and financial
statement valuation.
Similar to proposition 2, we observe three equilibrium regions. As in proposition
2, the first region appears for sufficiently high powered tax auditor incentives θ <
1−p
p . The figure shows that the probability of truth telling is increased. Intuitively, the
deferred tax opinion following report (b, t) reduces the attractivity to misreport. The
second region is valid for mid-level incentives 1−pp < θ <
λ
λ p+(1−µ)(1−p) . It is easy
to see that the report on deferred taxes extends this region, because λ > 1− µ ⇔
λ
λ p+(1−µ)(1−p) > 1. The third region appears for lower powered tax auditor incentives
λ
λ p+(1−µ)(1−p) ≤ θ < λ p(1−µ)(1−p) . The report on deferred taxes also shifts the valid
range for region 3 to the right because λ ≥ 1− µ implies λ p(1−µ)(1−p) > p1−p . The
key observation is that the probability of understating both financial and tax valuation
increases in both regions. Again, the statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes makes
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a report (b, t) less attractive, but now the taxpayer biases both valuations instead of
reporting truthfully.
It is interesting to ask how the statutory auditor’s tax competence influences the equi-
librium strategies. Proposition 3 reveals that λ and µ only affect the probability of a
report (b, t) sent by type b, t given as φa = 1−µλ
(1−p)
p θ . A larger ratio
1−µ
λ is equiva-
lent to a less tax competent auditor. Thus, a less informative deferred tax verification
increases the taxpayer’s incentives to misreport. Moreover, since νa = 1− φa is the
probability of reporting (b, t) in the third equilibrium region, a less tax experienced
auditor reduces the taxpayer’s propensity to avoid a report on deferred taxes.
The tax reporting strategies of a publicly listed firm are also affected by the statutory
auditor’s opinion on deferred tax assessment. Figure 5 displays the reporting probabil-
ities of type b, t taxpayers with and without the opinion.
θ0
1
0 1−p
p
1 θ¯2
p
1−p θ¯3
Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)}
Prob{(bˆ, tˆ) = (b, t)}
Figure 5: Publicly listed firm. Reporting probabilities of type b, t taxpayers with (dotted lines)
and without (solid lines) statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes as a function of θ . θ
measures the tax auditor’s incentives (as defined in Proposition 1). With increasing θ the tax
auditor’s incentives decrease. Introducing the statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes
increases the probability of a true report.
It is easy to see that the probability of truthful reporting increases over the whole
range of tax auditor incentives. Compared to the private firm setting, publicly listed
firms of type b, t show a significantly larger probability of truthful reporting. Given
the observations above, it is intuitively clear that the statutory auditor’s assessment of
deferred taxes will also reduce tax evasion (TE). We compute the measure as
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1. TEa =
0.5θ
(
(1−µ)(1−p)
λ + p
)
if θ ≤ θ¯2
0.5 if θ > θ¯2
in case of a private firm and
2. TEa =

0.5θ
(
(1−µ)(1−p)
λ + p
)
if θ ≤ θ¯1
0.5θ
(
(1−µ)(1−p)
λ
)
+0.5(1− p) if θ¯1 < θ ≤ θ¯3
0.5 if θ > θ¯3
for a publicly listed firm.
Figure 6 compares TE for our three different information environments. The solid
(dotted) lines depict TE for private firms (publicly listed firms). The introduction of
the statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes reduces TE for both private and publicly
listed firms, but the reduction is much more effective in publicly listed firms.
θ0
0.5
0 1−p
p
1 θ¯2
p
1−p θ¯3
TEo
TE f
TEa
Figure 6: Tax evasion (TE) in private firms (solid lines) and publicly listed firms (dotted lines)
with no information (TEo), financial statement information (TE f ) and statutory auditor’s report on
deferred taxes (TEa). Introducing the statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes reduces tax
evasion in both private and publicly listed firms. The reduction is more effective in publicly listed
firms.
At last, a closer look at the tax audit probabilities shows that the differences between
the scenarios with and without deferred tax report stem from differences in the equi-
librium regions. The difference between α f and αa within the regions vanishes when
we look at the effective audit probability of a report (b, t). In the deferred tax report
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scenario, the report (b, t) will only be audited in connection with signal D. Thus, the
effective audit probabilities are equal, because λαa = α f .
In summary, the quality of the statutory auditor’s deferred tax review influences the
equilibrium via two channels: (1) Misreporting (b, t) becomes more risky. Thus, the
b, t private firm has stronger incentives to understate both tax and financial statement
valuation. However, in publicly listed firms the probability of truthful reporting in-
creases. (2) The parameter ranges for equilibria with understated financial statement
valuation in private firms increase with the information content of the deferred tax
report.
4 Efficiency implications
In this section we look at the question how the tax auditor’s exploitation of the statutory
auditor’s deferred tax report influences the efficiency of the tax system. In our model,
efficiency has two dimensions:
1. Frequency of tax audits: The audit frequency can be measured by the ex ante
probability of a tax audit. We define
TAa :=Prob{report = (b, t)∧σ = D} ·αa+Prob{report = (b, t)} ·β a,
TA f :=Prob{report = (b, t)} ·α f +Prob{report = (b, t)} ·β f and
TAo :=Prob{report = t} ·β o
(6)
as the tax audit probability in the settings with the statutory auditor’s deferred
tax report (TAa), without deferred tax report but with financial statement infor-
mation (TA f ) and without any audit or financial statement information (TAo).
2. Tax revenue: We use the probability of taxing a type t taxpayer based on a
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reported tax valuation t as an (inverse) proxy for tax revenue and define:
TRa :=
(
Prob{(b, t) reports (b, t)}+Prob{(b, t) reports (b, t)})(1−β a)
+Prob{(b, t) reports (b, t)∧σ =C}
+Prob{(b, t) reports (b, t)∧σ = D}(1−αa)
TR f :=
(
Prob{(b, t) reports (b, t)}+Prob{(b, t) reports (b, t)})(1−β f )
+Prob{(b, t) reports (b, t)}(1−α f )
TRo :=Prob{t reports t}(1−β o).
(7)
Note that our TR - measure differs from the tax evasion measure (TE) used in the
previous section because TR captures sucessful tax evasion only.
The following two propositions compare both measures for both a publicly listed and
a private firm:
Proposition 4 Suppose a publicly listed firm (ω > γ). Comparing the tax audit fre-
quency and the taxation based on misreported tax valuation yields:
Tax revenue Tax audit probability
θ ≤ 1−pp TRa < TR f = TRo TAa < TA f = TAo
1−p
p < θ ≤ 1 TRa < TR f , TRa R TRo, TR f R TRo TAa < TA f < TAo
1 < θ ≤ p1−p TRa < TR f < TRo TAo < TAa < TA f
p
1−p < θ ≤ λ1−µ p1−p TRa < TR f = TRo TAo = TA f < TAa
Proof: See appendix. 
Three properties of proposition 4 are remarkable:
1. Note that TAo = 0 and TRo = 0.5 due to the trivial pure strategy equilibrium for
θ > 1. This explains the rankings with respect to the no-information setting.
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2. An information setting with statutory auditor’s report on deferred taxes domi-
nates the scenario with financial statement information only as long as the equi-
librium in this scenario is non trivial (θ ≤ p1−p ), because we observe higher
tax revenue and lower audit probability. Thus, providing the informative statu-
tory auditor’s report to the tax auditor is efficient. This point is quite intuitive,
because the tax auditor can enhance his audit efficiency using the informative
signal and, as a reaction, the firm reduces misreporting.
3. For a medium range of tax auditor incentives (1−pp < θ ≤ 1), we may encounter
higher tax revenues together with a larger audit probability in the no-information
setting compared to both other settings.
Proposition 5 Suppose a private firm (γ >ω) and define θ¯1 = 1−pp , θ¯2 =
λ p
λ p+(1−µ)(1−p)
and θ¯3 = λ p(1−µ)(1−p) . Comparing the tax audit frequency and the taxation based on
misreported tax valuation yields:
Tax revenue Tax audit probability
θ ≤ θ¯1 TRa < TR f = TRo TAa < TA f = TAo
θ¯1 < θ ≤ 1 TRa < TR f , TRa R TRo, TR f > TRo TAa < TA f < TAo
1≤ θ ≤ min{ p1−p , θ¯2} TRa R TR f < TRo TAo < TAa R TA f .
min{ p1−p , θ¯2} ≤ θ ≤ p1−p TR f < TRa < TRo TAo < TAa < TA f .
p
1−p ≤ θ ≤ θ¯3 TRa < TR f = TRo TAa > TA f = TAo.
In case of 1≤ θ ≤min{ p1−p , θ¯2}, TAa ≥ TA f and TRa > TR f never appear simultane-
ously.
Proof: See appendix. 
Proposition 5 reveals some interesting properties:
1. The efficiency result from proposition 4 remains valid for private firms in a situ-
ation with high powered tax auditor incentives (θ < 1−pp ).
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2. In a situation with medium tax auditor incentives (1−pp < θ ≤ 1) we observe
TR f > TRo for a private firm instead of TR f R TRo for a publicly listed firm.
Private firms exhibit lower tax revenues because type b, t starts to underreport
both financial and tax valuation. Note, however, that the statutory auditor’s re-
port on deferred taxes is still efficient compared to the setting without report.
3. Significant differences to the publicly listed firm setting arise in case of a tax
auditor with lower powered incentives. Now, the efficiency of the statutory au-
ditor’s report will not remain valid. The report will either imply a lower tax audit
probability at the cost of lower tax revenue or higher tax revenue at the cost of
a higher tax audit frequency. However, proposition 5 states that the report will
never be dominated. The most surprising point here is that an informative signal
over deferred taxes can increase the probability of a false tax base. A closer look
at proposition 5 shows that TRa > TR f especially appears at the scenario, where
type b, t mixes between the two misreports (b, t) and (b, t). The deferred tax sig-
nal increases the probability of reporting (b, t) in order to avoid the signal. But
the tax auditor challenges report (b, t) with a low or with zero probability. As a
consequence, a lower audit probability comes together with a higher probability
of a false tax base.
The figures 7 and 8 illustrate the key properties of propositions 4 and 5. The dashed
line represents the scenario with an observable statutory auditor report on deferred
taxes, the solid line the scenario without such a report but with financial statement
information and the dotted line the no - information scenario.
The numerical example in figure 7 is such that the audit probability for both private
and publicly listed firms is strictly lower in the regime with observable report on de-
ferred taxes as long as any tax audit occurs in the regime without deferred tax review.
Moreover, the figure shows that the ex ante audit probability jumps down when the
equilibrium regions given in propositions 2 and 3 change. Within these regions, how-
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(a) Private firm (γ > ω) (b) Publicly listed firm (ω ≥ γ)
Figure 7: Ex ante probability of a tax audit TAo (dotted line), TA f (solid line) and TAa (dashed
line) as a function of θ . θ measures the tax auditor’s incentives (as defined in Proposition 1).
With increasing θ the tax auditor’s incentives decrease. Parameter values used: p = 0.7, γ = 0.4,
ω = 0.35 for private firms, ω > 0.4 for publicly listed firms, ∆= 100, λ = µ = 0.8, S = 40.
ever, TAa and TA f increase with lower powered tax auditor incentives (θ ↑). The
reason is simple: The probabilities of the reports (b, t) or (b, t) are increasing in θ
while α and β are constant.
The probability of a false taxation base (TRa, TR f and TRo) for private and publicly
listed firms is depicted in figure 8. In case of a private firm, we observe an interval
for θ , where the probability of false taxation increases when the audit report concern-
ing deferred taxes becomes available. Moreover, in case of a private firm, the positive
relation between the audit probability and θ within the equilibrium regions depicted
in figure 7 does not always go along with an increase of the false taxation base prob-
ability. For θ > 1, for example, lower powered incentives increase the frequency of
reporting (b, t) instead of (b, t). Again, this is due to the type b, t, whose underreporting
probability increases with θ . Since the tax auditor does not challenge the downward
biased report (b, t), but audits (b, t) with α > 0, the probability of a taxation based on
a misreported valuation decreases in θ .
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(a) Private firm (γ > ω) (b) Publicly listed firm (ω ≥ γ)
Figure 8: Probability of a false tax base TRo (dotted line), TR f (solid line) and TRa (dashed line)
as a function of θ . θ measures the tax auditor’s incentives (as defined in Proposition 1). With
increasing θ the tax auditor’s incentives decrease. Parameter values used: p = 0.7, γ = 0.4,
ω = 0.35 for private firms, ω > 0.4 for publicly listed firms, ∆= 100, λ = µ = 0.8, S = 40.
We shall conclude this section with some comparative statics. We concentrate on the
influence of conformity, managerial incentives regarding tax and financial statement
valuation and the statutory auditor’s tax competence on the tax revenue measure. Table
1 presents the comparative statics of the measure TR for publicly listed firms.
θ ∂TR
f
∂ p
∂TRa
∂ p
∂TR f
∂γ
∂TRa
∂γ
∂TRa
∂R
[0, 1−pp ) (0) (+) (-) (-) (+)
[1−pp ,1) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+)
[1, p1−p) (-) (-) (-) (-) (+)
[ p1−p ,
1
R
p
1−p) (0) (-) (-) (-) (+)
Table 1: Public firms: Influence of conformity (p), managerial preferences for tax savings (γ),
and statutory auditor’s tax competence (R = 1−µλ ) on the tax revenue measure TR. θ measures the
tax auditor’s incentives (as defined in Proposition 1). With increasing θ the tax auditor’s
incentives decrease. Remember that TR is an inverse measure for tax revenues.
We observe that the influence of R = 1−µλ ∈ (0,1] is as expected. Increasing R→ 1
means a statutory auditor with almost no tax competence and, thus, a higher probability
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of a false taxation base meaning higher tax revenue.
The negative influence of γ on the false taxation base is due to the strategic tax auditor -
he increases the audit probability of a low tax valuation with a higher incentive weight
for the tax valuation.
Conformity will decrease tax revenue (increases false taxation base probability) if tax
auditor incentives are high powered (low θ ) and a deferred tax report is provided:
Generally, higher conformitiy increases type b, t probability of reporting (b, t) and de-
creases type b, t probability to report (b, t). These two effects are exactly equal in case
of no deferred tax report. Introducing the deferred tax report dampens type b, t proba-
bility to report (b, t) by the factor R < 1. Thus, the underreporting incentive of type b, t
dominates. When tax auditor incentives become weaker, type b, t always underreports
and the increased truthful reporting incentive for type b, t induced by higher p remains.
θ ∂TR
f
∂ p
∂TRa
∂ p
∂TR f
∂γ
∂TRa
∂γ
∂TR f
∂ω
∂TRa
∂ω
∂TRa
∂R
[0, 1−pp ) (0) (+) (-) (-) (0) (0) (+)
[1−pp ,1) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (+)
[1,min{θ¯2, p1−p}) (+) (+) (+) (-) (-) (+) (+)
[min{θ¯2, p1−p}, p1−p) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (-) (-)
[ p1−p , θ¯3) (0) (+) 0 (+) 0 (-) (-)
Table 2: Private firms: Influence of conformity (p), managerial preferences for tax (γ) and
financial statement (ω) valuation, and statutory auditor’s tax competence (R = 1−µλ ) on the tax
revenue measure TR. θ measures the tax auditor’s incentives (as defined in Proposition 1). With
increasing θ the tax auditor’s incentives decrease. Remember that TR is an inverse measure for
tax revenues.
Table 2 shows the comparative static results for private firms. The first observation
refers to the influence of conformity. As a difference to the publicly listed firms, in-
creased conformity has a negative impact on the tax revenue of private firms. The prob-
ability of a false taxation base increases because type b, t in a private firm has stronger
incentives to underreport both financial statement and tax valuation with higher con-
formity. This observation is in contrast to previous literature which usually assumes
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that conformity increases tax compliance (see for a discussion, e.g., Chan et al. (2010)
and Blaylock et al. (2014)). However, prior empirical studies that find a positive link
between book-tax conformity and tax compliance are based on public firm samples
only (Chan et al. 2010, Atwood et al. 2012, Tang 2015). For public firms, we also
find a positive relation between book-tax conformity and tax compliance when tax au-
ditors are not highly incentivized (see Table 1). One should, however, not generalize
these empirical findings to private firms because our model predicts the opposite tax
compliance effect for private firms.
The second observation is a change of sign in the impact of the incentive weights γ
and ω . For high powered auditor incentives higher tax valuation incentives increase
the audit probabiliy and lower the false taxation base probability. The opposite is true
for increased financial statement valuation incentives, because they make underreport-
ing both valuations less attractive and, thus, decrease the audit probability of report
b, t. For low powered tax auditor incentives, the impact of ω and γ on the equilibrium
audit probability for report (b, t) reverses. A stronger incentive weight on the finan-
cial statement valuation (tax valuation) decreases (increases) the probability of a false
taxation base.
As a last difference to the publicly listed firms, also the impact of statutory auditor’s
tax competence changes the sign when the tax auditor’s incentives are low powered.
For θ ≥ p1−p , higher tax competence of the statutory auditor (lower R) shifts reporting
from the report (b, t), which is audited with positive probability, to the report (b, t),
which will never be audited in equilibrium. Therefore, the statutory auditor’s higher
tax competence implies lower tax revenue.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
We integrate two novel features in a tax reporting game: In the first modification of a
standard inspection game, the tax auditor can observe the financial statements audited
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by a statutory auditor. The statutory auditor perfectly verifies potential overstatements
but never corrects potential understatements. Thus, firms can misreport both their book
and their tax income. We then extend this model by assuming that the tax auditor ad-
ditionally receives a report from the statutory auditor concerning deferred taxes. The
report is an informative signal of the true tax valuation of the firm. Our main inter-
est is in how the additional signal regarding tax valuation influences the equilibrium
properties of our tax reporting game and the efficiency of the tax system. One would
expect that a tax system with an additional informative signal is efficient with respect
to tax audit costs and tax revenue. Our results show that this intuition is not neces-
sarily true. The review of deferred taxes and the observability of financial accounting
information may induce private firms to avoid the signal by underreporting both their
financial statement and tax valuation. This reaction can reduce the tax revenue gen-
erated by the tax system. Moreover, if tax policy increases book-tax conformity, our
model predicts lower tax revenues from private firms. In contrast, tax revenues from
public firms increase with higher book-tax conformity if tax auditors are not highly
incentivized, and public firms, in general, reduce their tax evasion in response to the
observability of financial accounting information and audit reports.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Legal obligations: Overview
Country
Obligation to file financial ac-
counting statements together
with the tax return
Obligation to file the audit report
together with the tax return
Australia Yes No3
Austria Yes No
Belarus Yes No
Belgium No Yes
Brazil Yes No
Canada Yes No
China Yes No3
Czech Republic Yes No
Denmark Yes No
Estonia No No
Finland Yes No
Germany Yes Yes
Hong Kong Yes Yes
Hungary No No
Ireland Yes Yes
Italy No No
Yespan Yes No
Korea No No
Luxembourg Yes No
Netherlands No No
Panama No No
Poland Yes1 Yes
Russia Yes No3
Slovakia No No
South Africa Yes Yes
Spain Yes No2
Sweden No No
Switzerland Yes No3
Ukraine Yes No
United Kingdom Yes Yes
Uruguay No No
USA No No
Vietnam Yes Yes
1 Non-audited financial statements do not need to be filed.
2 The audit report is a publicly available information.
3 Survey respondents state that in practice the audit report is often enclosed along with the financial
statements or that the Revenue Agency may request this as part of tax audits.
Table 3: Legal obligations to file financial accounting statements and statutory auditor reports to the
tax administration. Data source: Own survey conducted between March and June 2016 among tax
managers, directors, and partners of PricewaterhouseCoopers.
6.2 Proof of proposition 1
The tax auditor’s equilibrium audit probability can be derived from the indifference of
type t taxpayer between truthful reporting and report t. Reformulating
γt = β o(γt+S)+(1−β o)γt (8)
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yields
β o =
γ∆
γ∆+S
. (9)
Type t taxpayer’s reporting strategy θ = KSδ∆−KS is obtained by rearranging
θ
1+θ
(δ∆−KS)+ 11+θ (−KS) = 0. (10)
6.3 Proof of proposition 2
We prove the equilibrium for each of the regions given in proposition 2 in two steps.
In the first step, we derive the tax auditor’s and the type t - taxpayer’s equilibrium
probabilities. In the second step, we check the conditions under which the equilibrium
is valid. We start with the private firm characterized by γ > ω .
Region 1: θ < 1−pp .
Step 1: The probability β f will be set such that type b, t is indifferent between truthful
reporting and report (b, t). We obtain
ωb− γt = β f (ωb− γt−S)+(1−β f )(ωb− γt)
⇔ β f = γ∆
γ∆+S
.
(11)
Also type b, t must be indifferent between report (b, t) and (b, t). Therefore, the prob-
ability α f can be determined by
ωb− γt = α f (ωb− γt−S)+(1−α f )(ωb− γt)
⇔ α f = γ∆
γ∆+S
.
(12)
The reporting strategy of type b, t is given by φ = 1−pp θ and results from the tax audi-
tor’s indifference between auditing and not auditing after observing report (b, t)
φ p
φ p+(1− p)(δ∆−KS)−
1− p
φ p+(1− p)KS = 0. (13)
The tax auditor is also indifferent between auditing and not auditing the report (b, t).
Thus,
(1− p)η
p+(1− p)η (δ∆−KS)+
p
p+(1− p)η (−KS) = 0 ⇔ η =
p
1− pθ . (14)
34
Step 2: We have to check the following conditions:
1. Clearly, 0 < α f ,β f < 1. Moreover, η > 0 and φ > 0 because of δ∆−KS > 0.
2. η ≤ 1 ⇔ θ ≤ 1−pp . Obviously, η < 1 implies φ < 1.
3. Type b, t will never report (b, t) because α f = β f and ωb < ωb.
Region 2: 1−pp < θ ≤ 1.
Step 1: In this region, type b, t is indifferent between reporting (b, t),(b, t) and (b, t).
This yields
ωb− γt = α f (ωb− γt−S)+(1−α f )(ωb− γt)) and
ωb− γt = β f (ωb− γt−S)+(1−β f )(ωb− γt)) (15)
implying α f = γ∆γ∆+S and β
f = ∆(γ−ω)γ∆+S .
As in region 1, the tax auditor is indifferent between auditing and not auditing the
reports (b, t) and (b, t). Solving
φ p
φ p+(1− p)(δ∆−KS)−
1− p
φ p+(1− p)KS = 0 and
pν+(1− p)
pν+ p+(1− p)(δ∆−KS)−
p
pν+ p+(1− p)KS = 0
(16)
yields φ = 1−pp θ and ν = θ − 1−pp .
Step 2: The following conditions have to be checked:
1. α f ,β f , and φ ∈ [0,1] because of θ < 1, δ∆−KS > 0 and ω < γ .
2. θ > 1−pp implies ν > 0. A binding upper bound with respect to θ can be derived
from ν+φ < 1 ⇔ θ < 1.
Region 3: 1 < θ ≤ p1−p .
Step 1: The audit probability α f is such that type b, t is indifferent between the reports
(b, t) and (b, t). Solving
ωb− γt = α f (ωb− γt−S)+(1−α f )(ωb− γt) (17)
yields α f = ω∆λ (γ∆+S) . The probability φ of report (b, t) by type b, t is determined as in
region 1 and 2 above.
Step 2: The following points have to be checked:
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1. φ ≤ 1 yields the condition θ ≤ p1−p .
2. Type b, t will prefer report (b, t) over truthful reporting becauseω < γ in a private
firm.
In region 4 (θ > p1−p ) the tax auditor has very low powered audit incentives due to
large audit cost or low detection benefits. In this case, auditing will not be profitable
even if both t types always report t. Thus, the trivial pure strategy equilibrium emerges.
Consider the publicly listed firm (γ < ω) now. Region 1 (θ < 1−pp ) does not differ to
private firms and, thus, the proof is identical. The same is true for the trivial equlibrium
in region 4 (θ > p1−p ). Therefore we only look at
Region 2: 1−pp < θ ≤ p1−p .
Step 1: The probabilities α f and φ are obtained as in region 1 (see above).
Step 2: The following conditions have to be checked:
1. φ ≤ 1 yields the condition θ ≤ p1−p .
2. Type b, t prefers truth telling over reporting (b, t) because of ω > γ .
3. The tax auditor prefers not to audit report (b, t) because
0.5p(−KS)+0.5(1− p)(δ∆−KS)< 0 ⇔ θ > 1− pp . (18)
6.4 Proof of proposition 3
The proof is very similar to the proof of proposition 2. We start with the private firm.
Region 1: θ < 1−pp .
Step 1: The probability β a will be set such that type b, t is indifferent between truthful
reporting and report (b, t). Solving
ωb− γt = β a(ωb− γt−S)+(1−β a)(ωb− γt) (19)
yields
β a =
γ∆
γ∆+S
. (20)
In the equilibrium, type b, t must be indifferent between report (b, t) and (b, t). There-
fore, the probability αa can be determined by
(1−λ )(ωb− γt)+λ (αa(ωb− γt−S)+(1−αa)(ωb− γt)) = ωb− γt, (21)
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resulting in
αa =
γ∆
λ (γ∆+S)
. (22)
Type b, t taxpayer’s reporting strategy is determined by the tax auditor’s indifference
between audit and non audit upon receiving a report (b, t). We obtain
(1− p)ηa
p+(1− p)ηa (δ∆−KS)+
p
p+(1− p)ηa (−KS) = 0 ⇔ η
a =
p
1− pθ . (23)
At last, the tax auditor must be indifferent between non audit and audit after report
(b, t) and signal D. Using the posterior probability
P(t = t|bˆ = b, tˆ = t,D) = pφ
aλ
(1− p)(1−µ)+ pφaλ (24)
yields
pφaλ
(1− p)(1−µ)+ pφaλ δ∆−KS = 0 ⇔ φ
a =
(1− p)(1−µ)
pλ
θ . (25)
Step 2: The following equilibrium conditions have to be checked:
1. Type b, t will not deviate from reporting (b, t) or (b, t) to (b, t), because the au-
diting probability β a determined in (19) implies a payoff ωb−γt strictly smaller
than ωb− γt.
2. Condition 0≤ αa ≤ 1 yields λ ≥ γ∆γ∆+S , which is fulfilled by assumption.
3. Probability ηa is positive by assumption δ∆ > KS. ηa ≤ 1 can be reformulated
to
θ ≤ 1− p
p
. (26)
4. 0≤ φa ≤ 1 yields
θ ≤ λ
1−µ
p
1− p . (27)
Obviously, (26) is stricter than (27) because of λ ,µ,and p≥ 1/2.
Region 2: 1−pp < θ <
λ
λ p+(1−µ)(1−p) .
Step 1: Now, the auditors equilibrium strategies are determined by two indifference
conditions concerning the type b, t - taxpayer’s reporting behavior. β a can be deter-
mined as the solution of
β a(ωb− γt−S)+(1−β a)(ωb− γt) = ωb− γt (28)
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given by
β a =
∆(γ−ω)
γ∆+S
. (29)
The second condition (indifference between reports (b, t) and (b, t)) is identical to the
first region. Thus, αa remains unchanged.
The probabilities φa and νa are given by the tax auditor’s indifference between auditing
and not auditing with respect to report (b, t) and (b, t) together with signal D. The first
condition is
(δ∆−KS) pν
a+1− p
1− p+ p(1+νa) −KS
p
1− p+ p(1+νa) = 0 (30)
and yields
νa = θ − 1− p
p
. (31)
The second condition is as in region 1, and, thus, φa remains unchanged.
Step 2: We have to check the following conditions:
1. νa +φa < 1 yields the upper bound θ < λλ p+(1−µ)(1−p) . This condition clearly
dominates φa ≤ 1.
2. β a > 0 implies γ > ω , which holds in a private firm.
Region 3: λλ p+(1−µ)(1−p) ≤ θ < λ p(1−µ)(1−p) .
Step 1: The equilibrium probability αa can be computed using type b, t taxpayer’s
indifference between reporting (b, t) and (b, t). Solving
(1−λ )(ωb− γt)+λ (αa(ωb− γt−S)+(1−αa)(ωb− γt)) = ωb− γt (32)
yields
αa =
ω∆
λ (γ∆+S)
. (33)
The probability φa is again calculated as in region 1.
Step 2:
1. The upper bound θ < λ p(1−µ)(1−p) is determined by φ
a < 1.
2. In a private firm, γ > ω ensures that a truthful report of type b, t is dominated by
report (b, t).
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3. The auditor prefers not to audit report (b, t), because
p(1−φa)+1− p
p+ p(1−φa)+1− p(δ∆−KS)−
p
p+ p(1−φa)+1− pKS < 0 (34)
is equivalent to λλ p+(1−µ)(1−p) ≤ θ .
Consider the publicly listed firm (γ < ω) now. Region 1 (θ < 1−pp ) does not differ to
private firms and, thus, the proof is identical. The same is true for the trivial equlibrium
in region 4 (θ > λ p(1−µ)(1−p)). Therefore we only look at
Region 2: 1−pp < θ ≤ λ p(1−µ)(1−p) .
Step 1: The probabilities αa and φa are obtained as in region 1 (see above).
Step 2: The following conditions have to be checked:
1. φa ≤ 1 yields the condition θ ≤ λ p(1−µ)(1−p) .
2. Type b, t prefers truth telling over reporting (b, t) because of ω > γ .
3. The tax auditor prefers not to audit report (b, t) because
0.5p(−KS)+0.5(1− p)(δ∆−KS)< 0 ⇔ θ > 1− pp . (35)
6.5 Proof of proposition 4
Define R := 1−µλ and A :=
γ∆
γ∆+S . The tax revenue and tax audit frequency measures
are given in the following table:
θ [0, 1−pp ) [
1−p
p ,1) [1,
p
1−p) [
p
1−p ,
1
R
p
1−p)
TRo θ2 (1−A) 0.5 0.5
TR f θ2 (1−A) 12(1− p)(1+θ(1−A)) 0.5
TRa θ2 ((1− p)R+ p)(1−A) 12(1− p)(1+θR(1−A))
TAo 1+θ2 A 0 0
TA f 1+θ2 A
1+θ
2 (1− p)A 0
TAa 1+θ2 ((1− p)R+ p)A 1+θ2 (1− p)RA
Table 4: Tax revenue and tax audit probability in publicly listed firms
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The relations given in proposition 4 are easy to see:
• θ < 1−pp : Note that (1− p)R+ p < 1 because of R < 1. Then the relations
TRa < TR f = TRo and TAa < TA f = TAo are obvious from the table.
• 1−pp ≤ θ < 1: R < 1 implies TRa < TR f . TAa < TA f < TAo also follows from
R < 1. Reformulating TR f = TRo yields a critical value θ = 1−pp(1−A) . Since the
critical value may lie in the interior of (1−pp ,1), the relation between TR
f and
TRo is indeterminate. The same reasoning applies for TRa = TRo implying a
critical θ = 1−p(1−(1−p)R)(1−A) that may also be in the interior of (
1−p
p ,1).
• 1≤ θ < p1−p : Again, R < 1 implies TRa < TR f < TRo and TAo < TAa < TA f .
• p1−p ≤ θ < λ1−µ p1−p : It is easy to show that 12(1− p)(1+θR(1−A))< 12 . There-
fore, TRa < TR f = TRo. Obviously, 1+θ2 (1− p)RA > 0. Thus, TAo = TA f <
TAa.
6.6 Proof of proposition 5
First, note that tax revenue and the audit frequency measures for θ < 1−pp are the same
as in proposition 4. We define R := 1−µλ , A :=
γ∆
γ∆+S , and B :=
ω∆
γ∆+S . Furthermore,
θ¯1 = 1−pp , θ¯2 =
λ p
λ p+(1−µ)(1−p) and θ¯3 =
λ p
(1−µ)(1−p) . Then the tax revenue and audit
frequency measures for θ > θ¯1 are given as in the following table:
θ [θ¯1,1) [1,min{θ¯2, p1−p}) [min{θ¯2, p1−p}, p1−p) [ p1−p , θ¯3)
TRo θ2 (1−A) 0.5 0.5 0.5
TR f θ2 ((1−A)+ pB) 0.5(1−B(1− p)θ) 0.5
TRa θ2 ((1−A)((1− p)R+ p)+ pB) 0.5(1−B(1− p)Rθ)
TAo 1+θ2 A 0 0 0
TA f 1+θ2 (A− pB) 1+θ2 (1− p)B 0
TAa 1+θ2 [((1− p)R+ p)A− pB] 1+θ2 (1− p)RB
Table 5: Tax revenue and tax audit probability in private firms.
Most of the statements in proposition 5 can be seen directly in the table:
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• 1−pp = θ¯1 < θ ≤ 1: TRa < TR f follows from (1− p)R+ p < 1. TR f > TRo
and TAa < TA f < TA0 are obvious from the table. The relation TRa R TRo is
valid because TRa < TRo for R→ 0 and B sufficiently low and TRa > TRo for
R sufficiently large.
• 1 ≤ θ < min{ p1−p ; λλ p+(1−µ)(1−p)}: TRo > TR f ,TRo > TRa,TAo < TA f and
TAo < TAa are obvious from the table. TAa > TA f is equivalent to
B
A
< (1− p)R+ p. (36)
This condition may be fulfilled for feasible parameters in our model. Reformu-
lating TAa < TA f yields
θ <
1
(1−A)((1− p)R+ p)+B := θˆ . (37)
A sufficient condition for TAa < TA f for all θ ∈ [1,min{θ¯2, p1−p}) is θˆ > θ¯2 =
1
(1−p)R+p) . Rearranging this claim yields
B
A
< (1− p)R+ p. (38)
Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for TAa > TA f implies TRa <
TA f for all θ ∈ [1,min{θ¯2, p1−p}).
• min{ p1−p ; λλ p+(1−µ)(1−p)} ≤ θ < p1−p : R < 1 implies the relations TR f < TRa <
TRo and TAo < TAa < TA f .
• p1−p ≤ θ < λ1−µ p1−p : TRa < TR f = TRo and TAa > TA f = TAo is obvious from
the table.
6.7 Derivation of tables 1 and 2
The following tables can directly be derived from tables 4 and 5. A, B and R are defined
as above. The first table contains the partial derivatives for publicly listed firms. Using
∂A
∂γ := Aγ =
S∆
(γ∆+S)2 > 0, the signs in table 1 are obvious from the table below.
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θ ∂TR
f
∂ p
∂TRa
∂ p
∂TR f
∂γ
∂TRa
∂γ
∂TRa
∂R
[0, 1−pp ) 0
θ(1−A)(1−R)
2 −Aγ θ2 −Aγ (1−p)Rθ2 θ(1−A)(1−p)2
[1−pp ,1)
−1−θ(1−A)
2
−1−Rθ(1−A)
2 −Aγ θ(1−p)2 – " – – " –
[1, p1−p) – " – – " – – " – – " – – " –
[ p1−p ,
1
R
p
1−p) – " – 0 – " – 0 – " –
The next two tables contain the partial derivatives for private firms. Note that ∂B∂γ :=
Bγ =− ω∆2(γ∆+S)2 < 0 and ∂B∂ω := Bω = ∆γ∆+S > 0 imply the signs stated in table 2.
θ ∂TR
f
∂ p
∂TRa
∂ p
∂TR f
∂γ
∂TRa
∂γ
[0, 1−pp ) 0
θ(1−A)(1−R)
2 −Aγ θ2 −Aγ (1−p)Rθ2
[1−pp ,1)
θB
2
θ(B+(1−A)(1−R))
2
θ
2 (pBγ −Aγ) θ2 (pBγ −Aγ((1− p)R+ p))
[1,min{θ¯2, p1−p}) – " – – " – −θ2 (1− p)Bγ – " –
[min{θ¯2, p1−p}, p1−p) – " – θBR2 – " – −θ2 (1− p)RBγ
[ p1−p , θ¯3) 0 – " – 0 – " –
θ ∂TR
f
∂ω
∂TRa
∂ω
∂TRa
∂R
[0, 1−pp ) 0 0
θ(1−A)(1−p)
2
[1−pp ,1)
θ
2 pBω
θ
2 pBω – " –
[1,min{θ¯2, p1−p}) −θ2 (1− p)Bω – " – – " –
[min{θ¯2, p1−p}, p1−p) – " – −θ2 (1− p)RBω −θB(1−p)2
[ p1−p , θ¯3) 0 – " – – " –
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